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Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights
Abstract
This paper investigates the extent to which people in five Middle Eastern countries endorse key beliefs of
developmental idealism that associate development with freedom, democracy, and human rights.
Developmental idealismis a set of beliefs concerning the desirability of development, the methods for
achieving it, and its consequences. The literature suggests that these beliefs have diffused worldwide among
elites and lay citizens and posits that when such beliefs are disseminated they become forces for social and
economic changes. Although developmental idealism research has primarily examined family and
demographic issues, developmental idealism has tremendous potential to influence other aspects of society.
This paper extends knowledge by considering societal aspects not addressed previously in the developmental
idealism literature: personal freedom, democracy, and human rights. Using survey data from Egypt, Iraq,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, we investigate how publics of these countries associate development with
these elements. We find that majorities believe development brings greater personal freedom, democracy, and
human rights. Conversely, the data show that in four of the countries majorities believe more personal
freedom contributes to development. These findings provide support for the idea that developmental idealism
beliefs concerning freedom, democracy, and human rights have diffused to lay publics in these five Middle
Eastern countries. We also find evidence of uniquely Islamic developmental models; a significant proportion
of people in these countries believe that more religion will bring more development.
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Middle Eastern Beliefs about the Causal Linkages of Development to
Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights
ABSTRACT This paper investigates the extent to which people in five Middle Eastern countries endorse key
beliefs of developmental idealism that associate development with freedom, democracy, and human rights.
Developmental idealism is a set of beliefs concerning the desirability of development, the methods for achiev-
ing it, and its consequences. The literature suggests that these beliefs have diffused worldwide among elites
and lay citizens and posits that when such beliefs are disseminated they become forces for social and eco-
nomic changes. Although developmental idealism research has primarily examined family and demographic
issues, developmental idealism has tremendous potential to influence other aspects of society. This paper
extends knowledge by considering societal aspects not addressed previously in the developmental idealism
literature: personal freedom, democracy, and human rights. Using survey data from Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, we investigate how publics of these countries associate development with these
elements. We find that majorities believe development brings greater personal freedom, democracy, and
human rights. Conversely, the data show that in four of the countries majorities believe more personal
freedom contributes to development. These findings provide support for the idea that developmental ideal-
ism beliefs concerning freedom, democracy, and human rights have diffused to lay publics in these five
Middle Eastern countries. We also find evidence of uniquely Islamic developmental models; a significant
proportion of people in these countries believe that more religion will bring more development.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we investigate the extent to which important causal beliefs within the develop-
mental idealism (DI) cultural model are present in the opinions of publics in five Middle
Eastern countries: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. The DI causal beliefs of
interest in this paper are that freedom, democracy, and human rights are causes of develop-
ment and that development produces freedom, democracy, and human rights. We examine
the hypothesis that these beliefs about the causes and consequences of development have
been disseminated widely among ordinary people in these countries. Although it is impor-
tant to investigate the worldwide prevalence of beliefs about the causes and consequences of
development, we focus here on five countries in the Middle East.
70
Sociology of Development, Vol. , Number , pps. –. electronic ISSN -X. ©  by the Regents of the
University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article
content through the University of California Press’s Reprints and Permissions web page, www.ucpress.edu/journals.
php?p=reprints. DOI: https://doi.org/./sod.....
It is important to note that our goal is not to examine the empirical relationships that
exist among development, freedom, democracy, and human rights. Those important issues
have been examined extensively by others. Instead, we examine beliefs concerning such asso-
ciations, namely that development is a cause of freedom, democracy, and human rights and
also a consequence of them. We are interested in the prevalence of beliefs about the causes
and consequences of development within general populations because the spread of such
beliefs can bring both social change and cultural tensions and clashes.
DI is a transnational cultural model encompassing many beliefs and values concerning
how development occurs and the social changes associated with development (Thornton
, ; Thornton, Dorius, and Swindle ). It defines as desirable a constellation of
attributes perceived to be associated with development, including industrialization, urbani-
zation, education, free markets, low fertility, equality, freedom, democracy, and human
rights. DI endorses a world that is dynamic, describes the pathway to development, and
specifies Northwest Europe and its overseas populations as possessing the good life that
serves as a model of development for the rest of the world. More specifically, DI informs
people that to become developed, societies must embrace a free market economy, low fertil-
ity, gender equality, freedom, democracy, and human rights, to name a few of the desired
elements of DI. DI also postulates that development will foster these attributes.
We recognize that values are important elements of DI and that beliefs can affect val-
ues (Lai and Thornton ), but we do not consider values in this paper. We exclude
values because there is already considerable research investigating people’s values—
including the related concepts of preferences and tastes. For example, there are extensive
literatures about values concerning economic growth, democracy, freedom, gender
equality, family size, and other aspects of life believed by many to be related to develop-
ment (Azadarmaki and Moaddel ; Inglehart and Baker ; Inglehart and Norris
; Moaddel and Abdul-Latif ; Norris and Inglehart , ). Our paper is
not about values and their association with development; instead, it breaks new ground
by investigating a different set of ideational elements: causal beliefs about the relation-
ships among development and freedom, democracy, and human rights. Individuals need
not value freedom, democracy, or human rights in order to espouse causal beliefs between
those elements and development. Causal beliefs indicate how people think the world works,
whereas values capture how they want the world to be.
Survey data indicate that many people in the disparate countries of Argentina, China,
Egypt, Iran, Malawi, Nepal, and the United States believe that development is both a cause
and an effect of many dimensions of family and demographic life, such as gender equality,
mature marriage, the involvement of young couples in spouse selection, and low fertility
(Abbasi-Shavazi, Nodoushan, and Thornton ; Binstock and Thornton ; Lai and
Thornton ; Thornton, Dorius, and Swindle ; Thornton, Ghmire, and Mitchell
c; Thornton et al. b, ). Survey data also demonstrate that the notion that
societies are organized in developmental hierarchies is widely held by ordinary people in
such diverse countries as Albania, Argentina, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Hungary, Iraq, Iran,
Lebanon, Malawi, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and the United States (Csánóová ;
Melegh et al. ; Thornton et al. a). Empirical evidence of the widespread prevalence
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of DI can also be found in an extensive body of ethnographic research, which finds that
many developmental ideas are widely held at the grassroots in many international settings
(Ahearn ; Allendorf ; Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell ; Dahl and Rabo ;
Guneratne ; Osella and Osella ; Pigg ).
However, the evidence concerning the globalization of DI causal beliefs among ordinary
people has primarily focused on family and demographic issues. We as yet know very little
about the causal beliefs of ordinary people regarding the influence of development on other
important matters such as markets, government, and freedom. We also know little concern-
ing people’s beliefs about the influence of such factors on development. This paper provides
valuable new information to help fill this gap by examining the extent to which people in
five Middle Eastern countries believe that development is a cause of freedom, democracy,
and human rights (three factors that we refer to generally as FDR). Our paper also provides
new insights into the extent to which people in these countries believe that freedom is a
cause of development.
There are international surveys such as the World Values Survey that have measured val-
ues in many countries, but they have not measured beliefs concerning the causal connections
among development, freedom, democracy, and human rights. Thus we designed and imple-
mented new data collections between  and  that were the first we are aware of
to measure causal beliefs concerning development and FDR. More specifically, we asked
respondents about their beliefs concerning a) whether development increases or decreases
FDR and b) whether personal freedom increases or decreases development.
We conceptualized and designed our data collections before the emergence of the politi-
cal movements generally referred to as “the Arab Spring.”However, as shown in table , the
Arab Spring emerged the month before we began our data collection, and, consequently, our
data collections occurred as the Arab Spring was occurring. Survey context can be important
in all survey data collections, and we cannot know the effects of the timing of our surveys on
respondent answers. What we have is a snapshot of beliefs regarding the causal connections
between development and FDR at one time point—with the hope that future surveys will
ascertain the stability of such beliefs.
We have three main goals in our analyses of these new data. The first is to examine the
extent to which people in these five countries believe that development causes FDR and that
freedom causes development. The second is to examine how the prevalence of DI causal
beliefs relative to FDR compares to the prevalence of DI causal beliefs concerning family
issues—beliefs that previous research has shown to be widely disseminated. The third is to
examine the extent to whichDI causal beliefs vary by respondent education, gender, and age.
We recognize that it would be interesting to compare the extent of DI beliefs in the five
countries in our study—both among themselves and with other places. However, compar-
isons across countries are outside the scope of this paper and must await future research.
We also recognize that causal beliefs about FDR and development are likely important
for behavior and social structures, but we do not evaluate the effects of these DI causal
beliefs on the behavior of individuals or on the actual levels of development, freedom,
democracy, and human rights in any country. This issue is of great interest but lies beyond
the scope of this paper.
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TABLE 1. Arab Spring Event Time Line Relative to Data Collection Months for Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey
Mo./Yr. Country Event Iraq SA Lebanon Egypt Turkey
12/10 Tunisia Nationwide protests following street vendor’s
self-immolation in protest of his unpermitted
fruit cart seizure.
1/11 Tunisia Violent protests followed by fleeing of authoritarian
president to Saudi Arabia.
Egypt Tahrir Square protests demanding resignation of
Mubarak.
2/11 Yemen Mass protests against ruling president.
Egypt Resignation of Mubarak; temporary transfer of
powers to military.
Bahrain Mass protests followed by military crackdown by
king with assistance from SA.
Libya Protests begin in Benghazi, followed by armed
uprising against Muammar el-Qaddafi.
3/11 Syria Protesters call for political freedom in city of Deraa.
Quickly spreads to other cities. Government
responds with violent crackdown.
Libya Western coalition intervenes in conflict, staging
airstrikes against Qaddafi’s troops, turning the
tide in favor of the protesters.
4/11
5/11
6/11
7/11
8/11 Libya Rebel troops enter the capital and Qaddafi goes into
hiding.
9/11
10/11 Libya Qaddafi found and killed by mob.
Tunisia In first election since Arab Spring revolts began,
Tunisians elect a moderate Islamist party.
11/11 Yemen President resigns.
12/11
1/12 Egypt Islamist parties win 70% of seats in first
parliamentary election since Mubarak’s ouster.
2/12–5/12
(continued )
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CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
Cultural Models of Development
Developmental idealism is a cultural model concerning societal development that shapes the
perspectives of policy makers and public opinion. Cultural models, or ideational frame-
works, are interrelated attitudes, beliefs, and values “about the proper order of society and
how it can be achieved” (Erikson and Tedin :). Models provide beliefs and values
that shape people’s understanding of the world and orientation toward it and prescribe
mechanisms for achieving personal and societal goals (Johnson-Hanks et al. ; Sewell
; Swidler ). DI is one such cultural model that is centered on development and its
relationship to other dimensions of life (Thornton , ). DI can have powerful
influences on people’s decision making and behavior (Allendorf and Thornton ).
Many ideas ofDI canbe traced back to theEnlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries and the writings of philosophers, social scientists, and policy makers of the nineteenth
TABLE 1. Arab Spring Event Time Line Relative to Data Collection Months for Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt, and Turkey (continued )
Mo./Yr. Country Event Iraq SA Lebanon Egypt Turkey
6/12 Egypt Mubarak tried and found guilty on charges of
accessory to and attempted murder of 2011
protesters. Sentenced to life in prison.
Islamic group Muslim Brotherhood candidate wins
first democratic presidential election.
7/12–10/12
11/12 Egypt President issues decree giving himself broad new
powers, including placing himself above the
authority of the courts.
12/12–3/13
4/13
5/13
6/13 Syria UN announces death toll in continuing conflict has
topped 90,000 and >1 million Syrians are refugees.
Opposition forces becoming more fractured and
dominated by extremist groups, many with
connections to Al Qaeda.
7/13 Egypt Military coup removes president from office and
detains him in secret location, triggering weeks of
protests.
Notes: Dark shading indicates data collection months for each sample country; lighter shading indicates months
(events) preceding data collection months for each sample country. SA = Saudi Arabia. Time line events are according
to the New York Times (“Timeline” 2013).
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century (Nisbet ; Sanderson ; Thornton ; Thornton et al. ). The scholars
and policy makers of those eras promulgated worldviews and beliefs about the causes and
consequences of development. As one would expect, there emerged and still exists a range
of views on the exact specification of beliefs about the causes and consequences of devel-
opment within DI. As Thornton et al. () state, “DI is similar to other cultural models
such as Chinese culture or American culture, which exist in different formats across geog-
raphy and history. . . . The notion that the DI cultural model varies across places, times,
and individuals is similar to the idea proposed by Eisenstadt () of alternate modern-
ities. Sometimes the differences betweenDI versions are fairly small and other timesmore
substantial” (p. ).
Despite the varying strands of DI beliefs diffused across individuals and groups, we argue
that there is a dominant strand of DI that has been disseminated widely to scholars, political
leaders, development agencies, and policy makers around the world, permeating the agendas
of many governmental and nongovernmental organizations (Thornton et al. ). It is the
causal beliefs about development within this dominant strand of DI that constitute the
focus of this paper. As we discuss below, that dominant strand of DI indicates that develop-
ment increases FDR and that FDR increases development. Our paper’s key hypothesis is
that the DI cultural model and its beliefs about the causes and consequences of development
have penetrated local culture in the Middle East.
The Dominant Model of the Development-FDR Nexus
We now discuss the main elements and historical background of this dominant strand of
DI concerning the causal relations among development and FDR. We also discuss some
alternative modernities, especially as they might contradict and diminish beliefs in the dom-
inant strand of DI.
The dominant developmental models of philosophers, social scientists, and policy makers
for the past two centuries have depicted the world as a dynamic place with societies evolving
at different speeds from low to high development (Nisbet ; Sanderson ; Thornton
et al. ). Northwest Europe and its overseas populations in North America and
Australasia have been portrayed at the apex of development, with other populations
seen as distributed at various lower levels along the developmental scale. This model has
proposed that movement from low to high development produces low fertility, equality,
mature marriage, free markets, freedom, democracy, and human rights. Causality in this
model has also been said to move in the opposite direction, with development being a
consequence of free markets, low fertility, equality, mature marriage, freedom, democ-
racy, and human rights.
More specifically, theory and public policy have posited strong positive relationships
between FDR and development, and those themes have continued to characterize much of
the academic and policy literatures of at least the last century. For example, modernization
theorist Rostow () argued that democracy, including the freedom of expression and
political representation, is essential for societies to progress through “stages of growth.” Since
the s, many development economists have argued that poor countries can best achieve
economic growth through market liberalization (e.g., Bhagwati , ; Wolf ).
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This idea gained mainstream acceptance at development organizations such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, leading to the “Washington Consensus” in the
s, “aid for trade” policies since the s, and the promotion of free trade today.
Within this school of thought, democracy and human rights are believed to occur as a result
of economic growth (Williamson ). At the United Nations and many other interna-
tional organizations, the primary perspective is one of “human development,” which posits
that there are links between development and freedom, democracy, and human rights
(Nussbaum , ; Sen , , ). Additional approaches to development, in-
cluding participatory development (Chambers ; Hickey and Mohan ) and rights-
based development (Häusermann ; Sano ), also feature explicit links between
development and FDR (Bollen ; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck ; Wejnert ).
Certain strands of thought on development are less enthusiastic about the proposition
that development brings FDR, including proponents of dependency (Frank ), world
system (Wallerstein , ), and postdevelopment (Escobar ; Sachs ) theories.
Some critics of mainstream development theory claim that it is precisely a lack of emphasis
on FDR as a prerequisite to development that has brought about what they perceive to be
dismal results in the global effort to “end poverty” (e.g., Easterly , ; Moyo ).
Others point to “East Asian Tigers” like South Korea as historical evidence that develop-
ment has occurred because of restrictions on FDR (Chang ). Across all theoretical per-
spectives, however, disputes are not over whether there is a relationship between
development and FDR but over the nature of the relationship. Development and FDR are
intertwined in virtually all contemporary development theories.
We argue that beliefs about positive causal connections between development and FDR
have been disseminated via many channels to Middle Eastern publics: from the world’s policy
and academic elites to national leaders, community elites, and on to the general public. Diffu-
sion mechanisms include the United Nations, foreign aid programs, governmental and non-
governmental organizations, the mass media, and educational institutions (Thornton et al.
). Nation-states around the world have adopted a wide variety of institutional practices
that are promoted as essential for development, including human rights and democratic gov-
ernance (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui ; Meyer et al. ; Tsutsui and Wotipka ).
The DI disseminated through these means exerts influence on many dimensions of life at
multiple levels of social reality, from the individual to entire societies and the world at large.
DI’s dissemination and acceptance have contributed to greater popular support for freedom
in personal affairs, which scholars have linked to dramatic increases in divorce, premarital
sex, nonmarital cohabitation, and unmarried childbearing in numerous places (Aghajanian
and Thompson ; Cammack andHeaton ; Esteve, Lesthaeghe, and Lopez-Gay ;
Lesthaeghe ; Thornton ; Thornton and Philipov ). DI has also helped drive
the international movement toward gender equality, small families, and mature ages at mar-
riage (Dorius and Alwin ; Ortega ; Paxton, Hughes, and Green ; Thornton
et al. b).
Although DI causal beliefs about FDR and development are often rejected when first in-
troduced, they are often accepted with additional time and reinforcement, though rarely
wholesale. Typically, the adoption of DI beliefs involves the mixing of local (particular)
76 SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT SPR ING 2017
culture with global (general) developmental culture into hybrid models of development,
which become forces for social change. We recognize that alternative development models
may dampen or even reverse beliefs concerning positive causal relations between develop-
ment and FDR.We know, for example, that theMarxist developmental model promulgated
in the former Soviet Union and other state socialist societies emphasized a dictatorship of
the proletariat rather than freedom and democracy. We also know that several countries in
eastern Asia followed a protectionist, state-driven, capitalist model, teaching their citizens
that national development should take precedence over individual freedom (Chang ).
There is a growing recognition of uniquely Islamic developmental models, which in some
ways decouple development from freedom, democracy, and human rights. According to the
Islamic Development Bank (), the main development challenges of Muslim-majority
countries include “sustainable economic growth,” “good governance,” and “human develop-
ment.” Partnership with the UN, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund is out-
lined as necessary and helpful, particularly with respect to achieving the Millennium
Development Goals. In this respect, Islamic models of development generally share many
goals with dominant development models.
At the same time, many Islamic developmental models emphasize Islamic religious
ideals. Some Islamic academics and policy makers integrate Islamic principles into pre-
existing theories of development, and often incorporate some of the principles of FDR
into Islamic developmental models, not because FDR principles are tacitly accepted, but
because they are rationalized as having deep roots in Islamic philosophy and law (Bayat
). Similarly, the concepts of empowerment, freedom, and individuality are deemed
to be desirable, though typically only in “Islamic forms” (Hasso ). One example of
this fine distinction is the avoidance of “democracy” and “secular politics” in the official
vision of the Islamic Development Bank (), but the adoption of the global buzz-
phrase “good governance.” This is noteworthy because it reflects a distinctly Islamic
model of development, a model that in most respects is very similar to dominant devel-
opmental models, yet different in its association with FDR.
Lived Experience of FDR and Development in the Middle East
We recognize that the causal beliefs people have about development and FDR may be
affected by the empirical relationships between development and FDR that people observe
firsthand or hear about. People’s beliefs about the causal relationships between FDR and de-
velopment may be reinforced by knowledge of a positive cross-sectional correlation between
national levels of development and country-level measures of FDR.We present here evidence
regarding such relationships. Our intent is not to evaluate the cause-and-effect relationships
between development and FDR in the real world but to recognize that such empirical rela-
tionships may weaken or strengthen people’s beliefs about a relationship between develop-
ment and FDR. That is, our focus in this paper is on people’s causal beliefs about the
relations between development and FDR and not on the actual relationships in the real
world, but we talk about the actual relationships because these may influence people’s beliefs.
The real-world correlation between development and FDR can be seen in figure , where
we show the international cross-sectional association between the UN’s Human Development
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Index (HDI) and national indicators of freedom for  countries. The linear regression line
summarizing this association indicates that the HDI and freedom indices are strongly and pos-
itively related. Additional analysis (not shown) finds similar relationships between HDI and
indicators of democracy and human rights. Observations such as these would reinforce public
perceptions of a relationship between development and FDR.1
On the other hand, the realities of day-to-day living may influence people in the Middle
East to doubt the existence of a positive relationship between development and FDR. Al-
though the regression line between development and freedom for the  Middle Eastern
and North African (MENA) countries in figure  is positive, it is weaker than for the world
as a whole. Also, figure  shows that, in general, MENA countries have substantially lower
levels of freedom than one might expect on the basis of their HDI scores. These observa-
tions suggest that the lived experience of many people in this region may diverge from what
the standard developmental model states concerning development and FDR (Clague,
Gleason, and Knack ).
Temporal trends in HDI and freedom within Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, and Saudi
Arabia do not support a positive association between HDI and freedom in these countries.
As shown in figure , HDI has been high and/or rising for much of the last  years, but
levels of freedom have been low and, in most instances, declining. Additional analysis (not
shown), indicates similar relationships when the indicators are GDP per capita, educational
attainment, democracy, and human rights. Thus the over-time, lived experience of people
within these five study countries would suggest only weak or even negative relationships
between FDR and development.
We hypothesize that the combination of views held by international academic and
governmental leaders, along with many local leaders, concerning the causal beliefs
FIGURE 1. Development and Freedom in the MENA and the World
Note: Observations are countries. MENA = Middle East and North Africa. Estimates for each country are the average HDI and
Freedom House scores for all measurements from  to . The Human Development Index is a composite index ranging
from low to high development (–) and includes national measures of income, education, and life expectancy. The Freedom
House score ranges from least free to most free (–).
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within DI that assume positive connections between FDR and development will be
more powerful than the alternative models and the lived experiences of people in our
study countries. That is, we expect the forces for beliefs in development as a positive
cause and a consequence of FDR are stronger than the forces for belief in no relation-
ship or an opposite relationship. This leads us to the general empirical hypothesis that
the majority of publics in our study countries perceive development to be positively re-
lated to FDR. We also expect that people’s personal experiences and some contrarian
views expressed by Middle Eastern elites about the relationship between development
and FDR could limit the overall perceptions of positive relationships between develop-
ment and FDR. Unfortunately, we cannot evaluate the individual forces producing the
final distribution of causal beliefs.
DATA
Our individual-level data come from face-to-face hour-long structured interviews con-
ducted between  and  with respondents living in Egypt (N = ), Iraq
(N = ), Lebanon (N = ), Saudi Arabia (N = ), and Turkey (N = ).
Each participating country implemented a multistage probability sample design that
produced a nationally representative sample of adults ages  and older, stratified pro-
portionally to the urban and rural areas of that country. Response rates for Egypt, Iraq,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey were , , , , and  percent, respectively.
The data are self-weighting for all countries but Saudi Arabia, where data are weighted
to account for an oversample of one region. The samples include roughly equal propor-
tions of men and women. The average ages of respondents in each country were .
in Egypt, . in Iraq, . in Lebanon, . in Saudi Arabia, and . in Turkey. Be-
tween half and three-quarters of Egyptian, Lebanese, and Saudi respondents reported
FIGURE 2. Trends in Human Development and Freedom
Note: Variables rescaled to range from  to . HDI = Human Development Index. Within-country comparisons of levels of
various dimensions are not strictly comparable but trends are comparable.
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completion of at least secondary-level education, as compared to around  percent of
Iraqi and Turkish participants. Nearly all respondents in four of the five countries were
Muslim; in Lebanon the distribution was more diverse— percent Muslim,  percent
Christian, and  percent “none” or “some other religion.” The surveys were adminis-
tered within the context of a larger project that was designed, in part, to measure public
perceptions of the relationships among development, family, and society in the Mid-
dle East. The research team took care to standardize as many aspects of the project as
possible within and across countries, including sampling specifications, questionnaire
content, Arabic and Turkish language translation, interviewer training, quality control
procedures, and data entry and harmonization.
We asked respondents to answer three sets of questions concerning development and
several societal and family attributes, including FDR. Exact wordings and coding schemes
for these questions are found in table . For the first question (section I), respondents were
asked: “What if there were more restrictions on personal freedoms? Would that help make
your country a little more developed, a lot more developed, a little less developed, or a lot less
developed?” We did not ask respondents whether they thought that democracy or human
rights would make their country more or less developed. Our second set of questions
(section II) reversed the causal arrow and asked respondents how increases in development
would affect several attributes, including three FDR and four family attributes. For both sets
of questions, we coded the small number of respondents who reported “don’t know” into a
separate category and analyzed this category along with the four answer categories given to
respondents.
For the third set of measures, respondents were shown a list of five attributes that might
increase in a country: more gender equality; more freedom of choice; more religiosity; more
democracy; and more integrity in government. After viewing this list, respondents were
asked to choose which of these attributes would have the greatest impact on making their
country more developed and which would have the second greatest impact. Respondents in
Saudi Arabia were not asked these questions.
By design we did not specify to respondents what we meant by development, freedom,
democracy, human rights, freedom of choice, religiosity, and integrity in government. We
also did not ask respondents to tell us what they meant by these terms. Evidence from
other research indicates that people in the Middle East conceptualize development very
similarly to the United Nations HDI, which is a composite of education, money, and
health (Thornton et al. a). Freedom, democracy, and human rights are broad con-
cepts with multiple dimensions that can vary in their precise definition and meaning
across groups and individuals. We do not believe that the meanings of these concepts
among Middle Eastern publics exactly match the views of other publics, such as those
in the United States. We also expect that the meaning of these terms can and do vary
across people and groups, but, nevertheless, we believe that there are general meanings
to such concepts. It is those general meanings that we address with these questions. Also,
we recognize that responses to our questions may be affected by question order and his-
torical timing, and we advocate for additional research on these issues.
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RESULTS
Belief in Individual Freedom as a Cause of Development
We first discuss results using the question concerning respondent beliefs about the effects of
a reduction in personal freedom on development (section I of table ). Figure  shows for
each country the percentage distribution of respondent beliefs about the effects of restricting
personal freedoms on development in their country. Categories are listed from left to right
from those strongly rejecting the DI belief (stating that less freedom would increase develop-
ment a lot) to those strongly endorsing the DI belief (stating that less freedomwould decrease
TABLE 2. Individual-level Measures of Developmental Idealism
I. Social Change Causes Development*
Now we are going to talk about something different—what might happen to (STUDY SITE COUNTRY) if some things
about (STUDY SITE COUNTRY)’s everyday life changed. For each of the following things, please tell me whether you
think it would help make (STUDY SITE COUNTRY) more developed or help make (STUDY SITE COUNTRY) less
developed?
a. If restrictions on personal freedom increase?Would that help make (STUDY SITE COUNTRY) a lot more
developed, a little more developed, a little less developed, or a lot less developed?
II. Development Causes Social Change*
Some people think that (STUDY SITE COUNTRY) will become more developed in the future. Let’s talk about what
things would increase and what things would decrease if (STUDY SITE COUNTRY) became more developed. If
(STUDY SITE COUNTRY) became more developed would:
a. personal freedom increase a lot, increase a little, decrease a little, or decrease a lot?
b. democracy increase a lot, increase a little, decrease a little, or decrease a lot?
c. respect for human rights increase a lot, increase a little, decrease a little, or decrease a lot?
d. equality between women and men increase a lot, increase a little, decrease a little, or decrease a lot?
e. parents choosing who their children marry increase a lot, increase a little, decrease a little, or decrease
a lot?
f. the number of children couples have increase a lot, increase a little, decrease a little, or decrease a lot?
g. age at marriage increase a lot, increase a little, decrease a little, or decrease a lot?
III. What Would Help to Make the Country More Developed
We have been talking about making (STUDY SITE COUNTRY) more developed.Which one of these five things would
help the most to make (STUDY SITE COUNTRY) more developed:
a. More democracy
b. More freedom of choice over one’s own life
c. More religiosity
d. More gender equality
e. More integrity in government officials
Which one would help second most to make (STUDY SITE COUNTRY) more developed?
(Same choices as above)
*Bolded response categories are coded as developmental thinking in figures 3 and 4. Nonbolded and “Don’t Know”
response categories are coded as nondevelopmental thinking in figures 3 and 4.
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development a lot). Countries are sorted from high to low according to the prevalence of
DI beliefs. In addition to the distribution across all five response categories, we indicate in
the far-right column the percentage saying that restricting personal freedoms would lower
development a lot or a little (the DI response).
Fewer than  percent of respondents in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia believed
restrictions on personal freedom would cause more development in their country. A major-
ity of respondents in each country, ranging from  percent in Turkey to  percent in
Egypt, reported that restrictions on personal freedom would make their country less devel-
oped. In each country, the modal belief was that restrictions on personal freedom would
make the society “a little less” developed. In each country except Turkey, the second most
common causal belief was that restrictions on personal freedom would make the country
“a lot less” developed. Respondents in Turkey were more evenly divided about the conse-
quences of personal freedom on development, with only a slight majority ( percent)
reporting that restrictions on personal freedom would cause their country to become less
developed.
Belief in Development as a Cause of FDR
We next consider the distribution of beliefs about the effects of development on FDR
(section II of table ), which we report in figure . As in the previous figure, we order the
responses reported in figure  so that the degree of endorsement of DI increases from left to
right, and the percentage endorsing DI (either a little or a lot) is shown in the far-right col-
umn. Bars are sorted from high to low on the prevalence of DI beliefs, by country and
measure.
The data support our hypothesis that most people in these Middle Eastern countries
viewed development as a force for increasing each item of FDR. The strength of the
FIGURE 3. The Consequence, for Development, of Restrictions on Personal Freedoms
Note: Percentages in marginal parentheses report the “DI response” and are the sum of “A little less developed” and “A lot less
developed” response categories. Parenthetical totals may vary slightly from response category percentages due to rounding.
Countries are sorted from highest to lowest prevalence of DI response.
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association between development and FDR varied to some degree—in some countries
respondents thought more development would bring “a lot more” FDR and in others
they thought it would bring “a little more” FDR—but in all countries strong majorities
believed that more development would cause more freedom, democracy, and human
rights in their country.
The percentage of Egyptian, Lebanese, and Iraqi respondents with this DI causal belief
exceeded  percent for all three items. With the exception of personal freedom, four-fifths
or more endorsed each of the three DI items in Egypt and Lebanon; moreover, at least
 percent of all respondents in Egypt, Lebanon, and Iraq believed that increased democracy
was a consequence of development. More than  percent of respondents in Saudi Arabia
reported the belief that development increases democracy and human rights, and  percent
positively associated development with personal freedom. The majority of respondents in
Turkey believed development increases all three items of FDR, yet in general the percentage
of respondents reporting this was lower than for the other four countries. Nevertheless,
the data are strongly consistent with our hypothesis that most people in each country believe
that development leads to increased FDR.
There are some differences in the distribution of responses across the substantive dimen-
sions of freedom, democracy, and human rights. Of the three dimensions, democracy was
seen as the most affected by development among respondents in each country. In Egypt,
the percentage who said that development causes democracy was essentially tied with the
percentage saying it increased human rights. Although large numbers in each country said
that development increased freedom, in Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia this was en-
dorsed less than the belief that development caused democracy and human rights, and in
Turkey the belief that development caused freedom was expressed slightly more than the
belief that development caused democracy. In addition, in Iraq freedom tied with human
FIGURE 4. The Consequence, for Freedom, Democracy, and Human Rights, of Development
Note: The original question wording for “Freedom” referred to “restrictions on freedom”. Responses to this question were reverse
coded to match the developmental idealism scales of “Democracy” and “Human Rights”. Percentages in marginal parentheses report
the “DI response” and are the sum of “Increase a little” and “Increase a lot” response categories. Parenthetical totals may vary slightly
from response category percentages due to rounding. Countries are sorted from highest to lowest prevalence of DI response.
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rights in being seen as the least positively affected by development, whereas in Turkey the
belief that development increased human rights was endorsed the least.
Comparisons with Causal Beliefs Concerning Development and Family Issues
We noted earlier that research has examined whether people around the world associate
development with family attributes. That research shows that there is a substantial associa-
tion in public opinion between development and family attributes as predicted by the DI
cultural model. This raises the question of whether the dissemination of DI concerning
FDR has been as great as the spread of DI concerning family issues. Previous research con-
cerning the spread of DI in respect to causal beliefs about development and family matters
provides a comparative framework to evaluate the extent of the dissemination of DI relative
to causal beliefs about development and FDR.
For this reason, we compare the reported causal beliefs of individuals in Egypt, Iraq,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey regarding FDRwith their reported causal beliefs regard-
ing changes in gender equality, spouse choice, fertility, and age at first marriage (section II of
table ). In figure  we report the percentage distribution of responses on the four family
items in each country. We also report in the margins of figure  the percentage stating the
DI position that development reduces fertility and increases gender equality, self-choice of
spouse, and older age at marriage.
A comparison of figures  and  shows that the range of answers for the family DI ques-
tions was generally consistent with the range of DI answers for the FDR questions. With
the exception of the age-at-marriage question in Egypt and Turkey, where roughly half of
respondents gave the DI answer, endorsement of DI for the four family items ranged from
 to  percent, which is very similar to the level of endorsement of DI for FDR. Gender
FIGURE 5. The Consequence, for Family Attributes, of Development
Note: The original question wording for “Choose own spouse” and “Fewer children” referred to “Number of children” and
“Parents choose spouse”, respectively. Responses to these questions were reverse coded to match the DI scales of ’Gender equality’
and ’Age at marriage’. Percentages in marginal parentheses report the “DI response” and are the sum of “Increase a little” and
“Increase a lot” response categories. Countries and bars are sorted from highest to lowest prevalence of DI response.
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equality was the only family attribute that three-fourths or more in each country said would
increase with more development; however, this three-quarters threshold was also reached for
spouse choice in Egypt and Lebanon (and  percent said so in Iraq). Thus endorsement of
DI causal beliefs regarding FDR was on par with endorsement of DI regarding gender equal-
ity and, to a lesser extent, spouse choice. In Egypt, Iraq, and Lebanon, support for DI causal
beliefs regarding FDR was actually higher than support for DI causal beliefs regarding fertil-
ity and age at marriage. This comparison illustrates the exceptionally high prevalence of DI
causal beliefs regarding FDR in these countries.
Comparing Beliefs in Possible Causes of Development
To this point, we have focused on the prevalence and strength of DI causal beliefs concern-
ing FDR and family matters. We now consider how respondents ranked various societal at-
tributes for achieving development. As we mentioned earlier, we presented respondents with
five attributes—gender equality, freedom of choice, religiosity, democracy, and integrity in
government—that might help further development in their countries. We asked respond-
ents to identify the first and second most efficacious things for making their countries more
developed (section III of table ). The first and second choices of respondents from Egypt,
Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey are displayed in figure .
Figure  shows that “governmental issues” was perceived as the most important fac-
tor for achieving development in all four countries. Of the five choices, democracy and
integrity in government were perceived as the most important two. We interpret “integ-
rity in government” to be a positive statement about the “absence of government corrup-
tion.” Respondents in Iraq and Lebanon identified integrity in government as one of the
two most important factors, more than any other option given. Among Egyptians, integrity
in government essentially tied with democracy as one of the two most important attributes
FIGURE 6. Percentage of People Who Believe Each Attribute Will Bring Development
Note: This question was not asked of respondents in Saudi Arabia. Percentages reported in marginal parentheses report the “DI
response” and are the sum of first and second choices. Countries and bars are sorted from highest to lowest prevalence of DI response.
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for bringing development. Turkish respondents chose democracy and integrity as the two
most important items, but they indicated that government integrity was less important
to development than democracy. Although democracy was endorsed less frequently than
integrity in government as a cause of development in Iraq and Lebanon, between  and
 percent of respondents in these countries endorsed democracy as one of the two most
important determinants of development.
The great importance given to integrity in government is especially striking. The absence
of corruption has been linked with development in the academic and policy literature (e.g.,
Collier ; Heidenheimer and Johnston ; Huntington ; UNODC ), and
our results indicate that belief in this causal relationship has been broadly disseminated
among publics in these Middle East countries. Irrespective of what academicians and policy
people say about development and government integrity, there also have been cases of finan-
cial corruption in the recent histories of some countries, and respondents could be drawing
on their experiences with such matters. Our data clearly suggest the importance of govern-
ment integrity as a factor in development among the great majority of Egyptian, Iraqi,
Lebanese, and Turkish citizens.
Many people rate both democracy and government integrity as more important influen-
ces on development than freedom of choice over one’s own life. In fact, personal freedom
was rated as one of the two most important factors by only  to  percent of respondents
in the four countries. If we combine endorsement of personal freedom and democracy
together as general indicators of freedom, we find huge endorsement of the belief that gen-
eral freedom fosters development, again consistent with our hypotheses that many people
believe development and freedom/democracy occur together.
Earlier we noted that very large percentages of people in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and
Turkey said that gender equality was highly related to development. Results reported in
figure  demonstrate that when respondents were asked to contrast gender equality with
freedom, religiosity, democracy, and integrity in government, very few endorsed gender
equality as one of the two most important factors in bringing development. In fact, with
just  to slightly less than  percent of respondents identifying it as one of the two most
important factors facilitating development, gender equality was the least chosen factor in
each country. This suggests that although gender equality is seen as related to development
by large numbers of people, it is seen as a less important cause of development than other
measured factors.
A fair percentage of respondents rated more religiosity as one of the two most important
influences on development (Egypt = , Iraq = , Lebanon = , and Turkey =  percent).
The prevalence of the belief that religiosity causes development is important for our the-
oretical framework because religious beliefs and values are often viewed as obstacles to
development (Harrison ) or as increasingly vestigial attributes of modernity (Norris
and Inglehart ). Yet substantial numbers, especially in Egypt and Iraq, endorsed
more religiosity as one of the two most important factors facilitating development. This
is consistent with the notion that opinion leaders in the Middle East who promote
Islamic development models that intertwine religious ideals with mainstream develop-
ment models are influencing some people’s causal beliefs.
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The lower proportion of people in Lebanon who reported religion as being an important
factor in facilitating development is likely tied to the greater degree of religious diversity
there. Islam is less predominant in Lebanon than in the other countries, and Islamic opinion
leaders in Lebanon are likely to have less influence than they do in Egypt and Iraq, so we
speculate that the preference of Islamic developmental models over mainstream develop-
mental models is a less common occurrence in Lebanon.
The Distribution of Developmental Idealism Causal Beliefs across Population
Subgroups
We now address our third motivating question: Do DI causal beliefs in a positive FDR-
development relationship vary by social and demographic groups within countries? To
answer this question, we examine beliefs by the respondent characteristics of education,
gender, and age. For this analysis, we took a global perspective and created an additive index
summing the responses to the four FDR questions reported in figures  and . For each
question, responses were coded from  to , with  indicating strong rejection of DI causal
beliefs and  indicating strong endorsement of DI causal beliefs (“don’t know” responses
were coded ).This additive index ranges from  to , and higher scores indicate stronger
belief in a positive FDR-development relationship. We pooled the data from all five coun-
tries and report the mean scores for this scale by categories of education, gender, and age in
figure .
The almost total absence of variation in beliefs in a positive FDR-development rela-
tionship by categories of education, gender, and age demonstrates the pervasiveness of
such beliefs across important subnational groups. Among respondents with less than a
secondary education, the mean score was .. The mean score was . among those with
a secondary education, for a difference of . between the two groups on the -point
index. The . difference between male and female respondents was even smaller than
FIGURE 7. Prevalence of Developmental Thinking (FDR Index) by Education, Gender and Age
Note: DI is here measured using the FDR index, a four-item additive index composed of questions reported in figures  and .
Age was recoded into -year age intervals (e.g., –=; –=), with the upper value of each age interval reported above.
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that observed for education. Age differences concerning beliefs were not meaningfully
different either, varying by . or lower for every age group except the oldest (+),
which had an index score of .. These results suggest not only that DI causal beliefs
are high in the general public but that they are remarkably high and uniform across
subpopulations.
CONCLUSIONS
Using survey data from nationally representative samples in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, and Turkey, this research set out to document the extent to which people in the
Middle East viewed personal freedom, democracy, and human rights as either a cause or
a consequence of development. We hypothesized that the voluminous academic and
policy literature and discourse, combined with the international cross-sectional correla-
tion between development and FDR, would lead the majority of people in these coun-
tries to espouse belief in a positive association between development and FDR, even
despite resistance to some aspects of DI. We hypothesized that these forces would be
more powerful than the scholarly and policy literature discussing alternative develop-
ment models and the fact that there is little over-time association between development
and FDR in the Middle East.
Analysis confirmed that on most dimensions people in these five countries perceived
strong causal associations between development and FDR. Although we cannot know from
our data which forces produced the belief that development and FDR are intertwined, we
can conclude that, overall, the forces producing these causal beliefs are stronger than those
producing the opposite causal beliefs that development and FDR are not positively inter-
twined. Also, the lack of data from outside the Middle East makes it impossible for us to
compare causal beliefs in that region with causal beliefs in other regions. We advocate for
more research on these issues.
Substantial majorities in all five countries reported believing that development brings
greater personal freedom, democracy, and human rights. Similarly, in four of the five coun-
tries substantial majorities believed more personal freedom would increase development.
Our research also demonstrates that beliefs in the causal connections between development
and FDR are widely accepted within subcategories of the population in each country. Belief
in causal connections between FDR and development did not appreciably vary by age,
gender, and education.
Iraqi and Turkish respondents were more likely to view development as a cause of
personal freedom rather than a consequence. Although our goal is to evaluate overall en-
dorsement of DI causal beliefs in the five countries and not to make comparisons across
countries, we offer some speculations about Iraq and Turkey. We also advocate for future
research to examine systematically the reasons for these differences.
In the case of Iraq, the results may be related to the fact that the data were collected
several years after the ouster of Saddam Hussein and the transition of political authority
from foreign administrators to democratically elected leaders. The immediate effects of war,
occupation, and radical political reforms likely weighed heavily on Iraqis’ views. Regardless
of the unique experience of the Iraqi public in recent years, they still reported a belief in the
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relationship between development and FDR on par with the views reported in the other
countries. Considering the magnitude of social change that the Iraqi public experienced
in the years immediately prior to data collection, the strength of the beliefs among Iraqis
regarding the relationship between development and FDR is stunning.
There are many possible explanations of the comparatively lower endorsement among
Turkish respondents for the idea that FDR and development go together. One possibility
is that the language and cultural differences between Turkey and the Arabic countries are
relevant here. Also of possible relevance is the fact that Turkey has long been at the cross-
roads between Europe and the Middle East and has had more experience with democracy
than the other countries. In addition, DI has been a very important element of Turkish pub-
lic life for nearly a century, with many elements of it having been adopted as official govern-
ment policy (Kavas ; Kavas and Thornton ). Such extensive experience with DI as
public policy may have given the Turkish people more opportunities than others to see how
the DI model was less successful than promised in bringing prosperity. Many of them may
therefore be more skeptical of DI causal beliefs. In addition, the Turkey of today emerged
out of the Ottoman Empire, which for centuries was one of the most powerful and impor-
tant states in the region. It is possible that at least some Turkish citizens have idealized their
historical roots in that empire, and this may have made them more skeptical of the causal
beliefs of DI.
Public opinion in Turkey may also be affected by the country’s recent experience with
the European Union (EU). Public opinion polls in Turkey show that only  percent view
the EU favorably and less than  percent want Turkey to join the EU (Pew Research
Center ). These relatively low rates may be the result of the EU’s reluctance to admit
Turkey for so long. The EU’s denial of admission may also have resulted in many Turks
rejecting the idea that Western ideals as reflected in DI are necessary for Turkey’s develop-
ment. In addition, Turkey’s economy seems to be doing well outside the EU, which may
further weaken Turkish endorsement of DI.
The findings from this research not only provide further empirical support for the wide-
spread prevalence of DI but also extend the literature on DI beyond family and demo-
graphic life to the political sphere. Previous research has shown that the great majority of
people around the world believe there is an association between development and gender
equality, age at marriage, fertility, and control over choice of spouse. Our research shows that
the percentages of respondents expressing causal beliefs about development and FDR are
as high as or higher than the percentages expressing causal beliefs about development and
family matters.
Although we have shown that on most questions substantial majorities in these five
countries reported belief in a positive association between development and FDR that is
consistent with the ideas of mainline academic and policy discourse, we do not suggest that
public opinion exactly matches elite opinion. And, as we discussed earlier, there are a variety
of strands of thought among academic, governmental, and policy elites concerning how
FDR and development are interrelated. We expect that public opinion lacks the kind of
depth expressed in academic and policy literature, instead being vague and fuzzy. Neverthe-
less, such fuzzy causal beliefs can be powerful.
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The close association between development and FDR in public opinion raises a
conceptual issue: perhaps many people conflate FDR and development so closely that
they see FDR as part of development, not just related to development. Although accep-
tance of this point of view presents issues of how to conceptualize the ideas, it would
make the main conclusion of our paper even stronger. Instead of development and FDR
being closely related in public opinion, as we have conceptualized it, FDR would be con-
ceptualized as being as much a dimension of development as education and income.
However, the fact that significant minorities do not see development and FDR to be
related leads us to prefer to think of FDR and development as being related but distinct
concepts, at least in many people’s heads. Further research on how people conceptualize
these issues would be helpful.
One of the more surprising findings of this research was that nearly half of respond-
ents in Egypt and a third of respondents in Iraq reported believing that increased religi-
osity would bring more development. This finding also provides evidence that a
substantial number of people in these countries have alternative or hybrid models of develop-
ment that include religion as an influence on development. A promising line of future re-
search would explore the ideational associations between religion and development more
thoroughly.
The extent to which people espouse positive attitudes toward development and also be-
lieve that FDR causes development has important implications for the entire region, provid-
ing insights into some of the possible ideological underpinnings of political campaigns in the
region (Hunter ). Since large numbers of people in each country want more develop-
ment and also believe that good and democratic government is an essential determinant of
development, it is possible that the idealism of the developmental model may serve as a mo-
tivating force for sociopolitical movements in support of more democratic governance in
Middle Eastern countries.
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. Scholars today know that drawing causal conclusions from cross-sectional data is problematic, but
there is no reason to assume that people at the grassroots are aware of this. Our point is not that
ordinary people are sophisticated social scientists who mentally fit regression lines to data, but we
believe it likely that some have rough mental images of cross-sectional relationships that influence
their views about such relationships. In any event, anyone with even a vague understanding of these
observed cross-sectional correlations would find support for the developmental narrative propagated
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